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Segmenting stimuli into events and understanding the relations between those events is
crucial for understanding the world. For example, on the linguistic level, successful lan-
guage use requires the ability to recognize semantic coherence relations between events
(e.g., causality, similarity). However, relatively little is known about the mental representa-
tion of discourse structure. We report two experiments that used a cross-modal priming
paradigm to investigate how humans represent the relations between events. Participants
repeated a motor action modeled by the experimenter (e.g., rolled a ball toward mini bowl-
ing pins to knock them over), and then completed an unrelated sentence-continuation
task (e.g., provided a continuation for “Peter scratched John.. . .”). In two experiments,
we tested whether and how the coherence relations represented by the motor actions
(e.g., causal events vs. non-causal events) inﬂuence participants’ performance in the lin-
guistic task. (A production study was also conducted to explore potential syntactic priming
effects.) Our analyses focused on the coherence relations between the prompt sentences
and participants’ continuations, as well as the referential shifts in the continuations. As
a whole, the results suggest that the mental representations activated by motor actions
overlap with the mental representations used during linguistic discourse-level processing,
but nevertheless contain ﬁne-grained information about sub-types of causality (reaction vs.
consequence). In addition, the ﬁndings point to parallels between shifting one’s attention
from one-event to another and shifting one’s attention from one referent to another, and
indicate that the event structure of causal sequences is conceptualized more like single
events than like two distinct events. As a whole, the results point toward common rep-
resentations activated by motor sequences and discourse-semantic relations, and further
our understanding of the mental representation of discourse structure, an area that is still
not yet well-understood.
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INTRODUCTION
Our ability to segment stimuli into events and to understand the
relations between those events is a key aspect of human cognition,
and crucial for understanding and interacting with the world (e.g.,
Zacks and Swallow, 2007). Within the domain of cognitive psy-
chology, there exists a large body of work investigating what cues
humans use to recognize relations such as causality (e.g.,Michotte,
1946/1963; Kanizsa and Vicario, 1968; Schlottmann et al., 2006)
and similarity (e.g., Gati and Tversky, 1984; Gentner and Mark-
man, 1997; Simmons and Estes, 2008). Many of these studies have
focused on visual stimuli, such as the collision events used by
Michotte and colleagues. However, as humans we also process
information about events in other modalities, including language.
In the linguistic domain, successful comprehension relies on lis-
teners being able to recognize and understand the different kinds
of relations that canhold between clauses (e.g.,Hobbs,1979;Mann
and Thompson, 1986; Sanders et al., 1992; Kehler, 2002; Asher and
Lascarides, 2003). For example, if someone says to a listener that
“Tom yelled at Peter” and then continues with “Peter kicked Tom’s
car,” the listener’s understanding of what the speaker is trying to
convey will be very different depending on whether she construes
Tom’s yelling to be what resulted in Peter kicking Tom’s car (a
causal relation), or whether she thinks Tom yelled at Peter because
Peter had kicked his car (an explanation relation). In other words,
the listener’s inferences about the coherence relation between these
two clauses (and correspondingly, the events they describe) have a
fundamental effect on how she understands the situation.As noted
by Webber et al. (2003), “a text means more than the sum of its
component sentences. One source of additional meaning are rela-
tions taken to hold between adjacent sentences” (see also Sanders
et al., 1993, p. 545). Thus, for successful communication, com-
prehenders need to be able to ﬁgure out the intended coherence
relations between clauses1.
1The research reported in this paper explores not only the relations that people con-
struct between clauses (and the events they describe) but also the relations between
events that are presented in a non-linguisticway. For the sake of brevity,when talking
about people’s interpretation of linguistic input, this paper will often simply refer to
the coherence relations between events, rather than “the coherence relations between
the events that are described by the two clauses”or “the coherence relations between
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However, existingwork in the linguistic domainhas not reached
a consensus about (i) what coherence relations there are, or (ii)
how they are represented (see e.g., Sanders et al., 1993; Webber
et al., 2003 for discussion). Some researchers argue that all coher-
ence relations can be derived from a small set of primitives (e.g.,
Sanders et al., 1992;Kehler, 2002)whereas othersworkwith a large,
relatively unconstrained set of relations (e.g., Mann and Thomp-
son, 1988). Furthermore, researchers differ in how they represent
coherence relations, e.g., as hierarchical structures or as logical
rules, and in what role they attribute to explicit connectives such
as “because” and “as a result.”
This paper aims to further our understanding of coherence
relations – in particular, which relations are “psychologically real”
and how they might be represented – by exploring the interface
between the linguistic and non-linguistic domains. The experi-
ments reported here used a cross-modal priming paradigm where
participants carried out sequences of motor actions involving
small objects, and then completed a seemingly unrelated linguistic
sentence-continuation task. For example, a participant might roll
a ball toward toy bowling pins in order to knock them over (cause-
effect sequence), and then be asked to provide a continuation for
a sentence such as “Peter tickled John.” Two experiments tested
whether and how the coherence relations represented by themotor
actions (e.g., causal events vs. events that do not involve causality)
inﬂuence participants’ performance in the linguistic task.
Existing work has found evidence for action-language con-
gruity effects in a range of areas, including the semantics of space
and motion (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan and Tay-
lor, 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008) as well as emotional valence
and motion (e.g., Casasanto and Dijkstra, 2010). For example,
Zwaan and Taylor found that the physical act of rotating a knob
interacts with the comprehension of sentences involving man-
ual rotation, such as “Liza opened the pickle jar.” These ﬁndings
also receive support from neurolinguistic investigations showing
that the cortical areas activated during the processing of action
verbs such as “kick” overlap with the areas that are activated when
people physically perform the same action (e.g., Buccino et al.,
2005; Pulvermüller et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005). However,
the question of whether discourse-level aspects of language pro-
duction may also involve domain-general representations is not
yet well-understood. For some early evidence, see Kaiser (2009),
summarized in the General Discussion.
Both of the experiments reported here make use of priming –
i.e., the observation that prior exposure to a stimulus inﬂuences
(often facilitates) subsequent processing of a similar stimulus.
Prior work has shown that priming occurs in a range of lin-
guistic domains, including syntax, semantics, and phonology. For
example, in the domain of syntax, producing a particular syntac-
tic structure boosts the likelihood of the speaker producing the
same structure again (e.g., Bock, 1986; Pickering and Branigan,
the events that comprehenders assume the speaker intends their linguistic output
to describe.” However, despite this simpliﬁcation, we assume that to fully under-
stand linguistic input, comprehenders construct a propositional representation of
the events that a particular linguistic form describes and also engage in real-world
reasoning about the current state of affairs (e.g., that kicking someone’s car might
result in the car owner reacting negatively.)
1998). The two experiments reported here use priming to see if
two processes – the observation and execution of motor actions
on the one hand, and language production on the other hand –
make use of the same (or overlapping) underlying representations.
Priming provides uswith a tool to identify and diagnose properties
of the representations utilized during the observation and execu-
tion of actions and during language production,which can further
our understanding of the abstract mental representations involved
in the production and conceptualization of coherence relations.
The experiments reported here have two common goals. The
ﬁrst goal is to learn more about how people represent coherence
relations in the linguistic domain. As mentioned above, this is
an area that is not yet well-understood, and many central ques-
tions remain open. The second goal is to learn about the relation
between the linguistic domain and the non-linguistic domain,
especially in terms of how humans represent relations between
events in these two domains.
Experiment 1 tested whether (i) performing a motor action
involving a cause-effect relation can bias participants to produce
causal relations in a subsequent, unrelated linguistic task, and
whether (ii) our mental representations distinguish between dif-
ferent sub-types of causality. If carrying out causal motor actions
inﬂuences participants’ linguistic choices in the production task,
this provides evidence that the representations activated by the
motor actions and discourse-level coherence representations over-
lap with each other. Furthermore, by taking a closer look at differ-
ent kinds of causal relations – in particular the relation between
causal sequences where the second action is an intentional reac-
tion vs. causal sequences where the second action is an involuntary
consequence – we can start to gain insights into what kind of infor-
mation is encoded in these representations, i.e., how ﬁne-grained
they are.
Experiment 2 continues to explore the relation between linguis-
tic and non-linguistic domains. Whereas Experiment 1 focuses
on the question of whether ﬁne-grained information about the
relations between events can be represented in a domain-general
way, Experiment 2 looks at a high-level, general property of
events, namely event boundaries. This study has two main aims:
ﬁrst, to test whether the presence/absence of event boundaries in
motor actions inﬂuences how participants complete the linguistic
sentence-continuation task. Inparticular, it testswhether perform-
ing two distinct motor actions results in participants producing
more continuations with two distinct subjects (i.e., continuations
which shift attention to a new character), compared to a situation
where only one motor action is performed. In other words, does
shifting from one action to the next in one domain boost the likeli-
hood of shifting from one referent to the next in another domain?
We chose to analyze the subjects of participants’ continuation
sentences because of the well-known connection between sub-
ject hood and topicality (Reinhart, 1982; Chafe, 1994; Lambrecht,
1994). In other words, analyzing the subjects of the continua-
tion sentences can provide a measure of topic-shifting, allowing
us to assess whether shifting from one action to the next (in the
domain of motor actions) has consequences on the linguistic level
in terms of topic-shifts. Second, in order to gain insights into how
causality is represented, Experiment 2 tests whether a causal action
sequence patterns more like a sequence of two distinct actions or
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like a single action. Because causal sequences often consist of mul-
tiple sub-events (e.g., event 1: I roll the ball, event 2: the bowling
pins fall over), it is not a priori clear whether they are conceptu-
alized as a single event (possibly with complex internal structure)
or as two separate events.
Broadly speaking, the research presented in this paper has
implications for our understanding of the mental representation
of coherence relations, an area that is not yet well-understood. The
results suggest thatmotor actions activate richly encoded represen-
tations that can overlap, on an abstract level, with discourse-level
aspects of language. Investigating effects of motor actions on
language further contributes to our understanding of causality
sub-types and how causal sequences are conceptualized.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 focuses on two related issues, namely (i) the
domain-generality of coherence representations and (ii) the level
of detail present in these representations. In exploring the domain-
generality of how people represent relations between events, this
study focuses on the notion of causality. Causal connections have
been argued to be fundamental to how humans conceptualize
events (e.g., Sanders, 2005; see also Trabasso and van den Broek,
1985; Wolfe et al., 2005 on the facilitative effects of causal connec-
tions on memory and processing), and Experiment 1 tests whether
causal relations between physical events involve the same kinds of
mental representations as causal relations between linguistically
encoded events. Speciﬁcally, Experiment 1 tests whether execu-
tion of motor actions that represent causal relations inﬂuences the
rate of causal relations produced in a language task.
In addition, this study also asks how detailed such causality
representation are. Do comprehenders merely activate a rudimen-
tary notion of causality that is shared across domains, or does this
domain-general representation include ﬁne-grained information
about sub-types of causality? In particular, this study focuses on
the distinction between two sub-types of causality: (i) situations
where the result is involuntary consequence and (ii) continuations
where the result consists of a volitional, intentional reaction. In the
subsequent discussion, these two causal sub-types are referred to
as the consequence-type and the reaction-type. Examples are shown
in (1). In (1a), the result of falling over is an involuntary conse-
quence of being kicked, whereas in (1b), the act of kicking back is
a deliberate, intentional reaction to the original kicking event.
Jason kicked Matt. Matt fell over. ⇒ consequence type (1a)
Jason kicked Matt. Matt kicked him back. ⇒ reaction type (1b)
Although most linguistic approaches to coherence relations
do not distinguish these two sub-types of causality, this distinc-
tion is made in Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST, Mann and
Thompson, 1988), a theory which aims to provide a descriptive
characterization of how text is organized. Mann and Thomp-
son propose a large number of different discourse relations,
including “Volitional result” and “Non-volitional result.” The for-
mer is (i) a situation where the initial action/situation causes
another action that is volitional, whereas the latter is (ii) a sit-
uation where the initial action/situation causes another action
that is not volitional (see Mann and Thompson, 1988, p. 275
for further details and examples). Thus, this corresponds to the
distinction between consequence-type and reaction-type causal
relations. Recent research on Dutch by Stukker et al. (2008) also
makes a number of important, ﬁne-grained distinctions regarding
sub-types of causality, including intentional vs. non-intentional
causation (see e.g., Stukker et al., 2008, p. 1305 regarding the use of
the two connectives daardoor “because of that” and daroom “that’s
why,” which are associated with non-intentional and intentional
causality, respectively).
However, as Knott (1993) notes, it is important to ask whether
this distinction is psychologically real:“How do we decide whether
to subdivide or not to subdivide result into volitional result and
non-volitional result? Again, different cuts through the space of
relations are possible: why distinguish between volitional and non-
volitional result, and not between, say, immediate and delayed
result?” (Knott, 1993, p. 48). Shedding light on this question
is the second main aim of Experiment 1. Thus, in addition to
investigating the domain-generality of causality representations,
this experiment also tests whether the distinction into reaction-
type causality and consequence-type causality is justiﬁable, and
in doing so, aims to gain new insights into how detailed our
representations of causality are.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty adult native English speakers from the University of South-
ern California community participated. All studies reported in
this paper were approved by the University of Southern California
University Park Institutional Review Board, which is fully accred-
ited by the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research
Protection Programs (AAHRPP).
Materials
Motor action trials (Priming trials). This study used 12 critical
prime actions and 24 ﬁller actions. The actions involved manipu-
lating small toys or other objects. The critical actions were of three
types: (i) Causal actions, (ii) Two-Event actions, and (iii) One-
Event actions. In causal actions, one action causes something to
happen (e.g., rolling a ball into dominos to make them fall over).
Because the prime actions all involved inanimate objects/toys,
the Causal actions all exemplify consequence-type causality. Two-
event actions involved two distinct actions that are not causally
connected (e.g., open and close a folding ruler, tie a bendy pen-
cil into a knot). One-event actions involved events that could be
construed as a single action (e.g., building part of a jigsaw puzzle).
Examples are provided in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Norming study. An initial norming study was conducted to
ensure that the three action types were indeed conceptualized
as intended. The norming study included a large set of differ-
ent actions, including Causal actions, Two-Event, and One-Event
actions, actions that involved sorting objects into categories, and
other kinds of actions. Eighteen native English speakers (who
did not participate in any of the other studies) watched the
experimenter perform each action, repeated the action them-
selves and were then asked to indicate whether the action is best
described as “two unrelated things happening,”“one thing causing
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another thing to happen,”“two similar things happening,”“objects
being sorted into different categories or groups,” or “none of the
above.” Based on the outcomes of this norming study, four action
sequences that were consistently judged to be causal were iden-
tiﬁed and chosen as the Causal primes for the main experiment.
Furthermore, four action sequences that were consistently judged
to involve two unrelated things happening were chosen to be the
Two-Event actions in the main experiment, and four One-Event
action sequences were chosen from actions that in the priming
study were not judged to involve causation, similarity, sorting, or
multiple actions.
Table 1 | Examples of prime actions.
Causal Roll a ball toward domino pieces to knock them over
(Figure 1A)
Causal Push a toy car so that it runs into a second toy car and
makes the second car move forward
One-event Assemble a corner of a jigsaw puzzle (Figure 1B)
One-event Build a sandwich using toy/fake “food”
Two-event Open and close folding ruler, tie a knot in bendy pencil
(Figure 1C)
Two-event Make an X-shape with two yellow sticks, then roll a die
It is worth noting that the One-Event actions involve smaller
sub-actions (e.g., combining the different jigsaw pieces into a big-
ger piece of the puzzle). Thus, the term “One-Event” refers to
the cumulative event that is composed of the smaller sub-actions.
These kinds of One-Event actions were used in order to keep the
duration and intuitive “complexity” of the actions as compara-
ble as possible. Crucially, people’s norming responses suggest that
they did not perceive the One-Event actions as involving causality,
similarity or two distinct events.
Generally speaking, any action or event can be viewed on
different levels of granularity and decomposed into smaller and
smaller sub-parts (e.g., the act of picking up a puzzle piece could
be further decomposed into various sub-components involving
visual perception, programming of a reaching motion, carry-
ing out the reaching motion, and so on). What is most rel-
evant here is that, relatively speaking, the sub-components of
the One-Event trials are conceptualized as contributing toward
a single goal-driven action (e.g., assembling a puzzle or building
a sandwich). Thus, in this regard they contrast with the Two-
Event actions, which do not form a single, coherent, goal-driven
action.
The 24 ﬁller actions used in the main study were also chosen
on the basis of the norming study, to ensure that they were not
perceived as involving causation, similarity, sorting or multiple
FIGURE 1 | (A) Example of a Causal action. (B) Example of a One-Event action. (C) Example of a Two-Event action.
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actions. This was done to minimize any danger of the ﬁller actions
priming the target trials.
Sentence-continuation trials (Target trials). In the main exper-
iment, the motor action prime trials were intermixed with seman-
tically unrelated sentence-continuation trials, where participants
provided a continuation sentence to a transitive prompt sentence
(ex.2). The study contained 9 critical sentence-continuation tri-
als and 24 ﬁller sentence-continuation trials. The critical prompt
sentences were transitive sentences with two male or two female
names. The verbs were all agent-patient verbs involving physical
interaction (kick,pinch, tickle, scratch, slap,punch,poke,push,hit )2.
Agent-patient verbs were used in order to keep the semantic class
of the verbs consistent. We chose to use verbs involving physi-
cal interactions because the prime actions were also physical (see
e.g., Schlottmann et al., 2006; on differences between physical and
non-physical causation, see also Kanizsa and Vicario, 1968).
Critical trials consisted of pairs of action primes and sentence-
continuation prompts. Because there were three conditions
(Causal prime action, Two-Event prime action, and One-Event
prime action), we created three lists using a Latin-Square design.
Reverse versions of each list were also created to control for effects
of presentation order. In both forward and reverse lists, the prime
action trial immediately preceded the sentence-continuation trial
(i.e., there were no intervening trials between primes and tar-
gets). However, the ﬁller actions and ﬁller sentence-continuation
trials were not presented in pairs, but rather pseudorandomly
intermixed. This was done to ensure that participants would not
perceive the actions and the sentences as being connected to each
other.
Jason kicked Matt. Matt hit him in retaliation.
Jason kicked Matt. He was a rather violent person.
(2)
PROCEDURE
Participants sat in front of a computer screen at a wide table. On
action trials, the screen showed the word “ACTION.” Upon see-
ing this, the participant turned away from the computer screen,
watched the experimenter perform the intended action, and then
repeated it. (The actionswere not described inwords at any point.)
After completing the action, the participant would press a key on
the keyboard. The screen would then move on to the next trial, and
show the word ACTION (if the next trial was also an action trial),
or it would show a sentence that the participant had to type a con-
tinuation for (if the next trial was a sentence-completion trial).
On sentence-continuation trials, participants were instructed to
2The study also included three verbs of social interaction (embrace, greet, and hug ).
However, these verbs were excluded from further analysis because their semantic
properties differ from the agent-patient verbs. In particular, these social interaction
verbs are (by default) construed as involving reciprocal actions – for example, when
someone greets another person, the default assumption is that the other person
reciprocates. Crucially, these verbs do not involve a clear agent-patient asymmetry,
in contrast to verbs like “hit” or “scratch” where one person is clearly the agent and
other is the “undergoer” who is affected by the agent’s actions (see also Levin, 1993
for more on verb classes).
write a natural-sounding continuation sentence for the sentence
shown on the screen. They were encouraged to avoid overthink-
ing, and to write what ﬁrst came to mind. After completing the
sentence-continuation, the participant would press a key, and the
screen would either show the word ACTION or another sentence
that the participant was asked to continue. This set-up was used
to create the impression that the ordering of sentence-completion
trials and action trials was random.
Coding
Continuations were double-coded by two blind coders, who ana-
lyzed the semantic coherence relation between the prompt sen-
tence and the continuation sentence provided by the participant.
For example, coders marked whether the event in the continuation
sentence was a consequence of the event described in the prompt
sentence, or perhaps an explanation why the prompt sentence
event happened. The coding schema used the coherence relations
from Kehler (2002) and Kehler et al. (2008). The relations that
are most relevant to the current discussion are shown in Table 2,
with examples. Building on Rohde (2008), training and detailed
coding guidelines were used to ensure consistency among coders.
Each coder went through the data independently. Coders were
instructed to be conservative and to avoid over-interpretation, i.e.,
to err on the side of choosing “unclear” if there was not enough
information available to determine the intended coherence rela-
tion. Subsequently, any discrepancies between the coders were
resolved through discussion. If the two coders did not agree on
a coherence relation or agreed that not enough information was
available to determine intended coherence relation, the trial was
coded as“unclear.” In the end, 4.8% of the critical trials were coded
as having unclear/ambiguous relations.
In addition to the coherence relations from Kehler’s work,
we also distinguished two sub-types of cause-effect relations, as
mentioned above: (i) continuations where the result is involun-
tary/automatic consequence (consequence-type) and (ii) continu-
ations where the result consists of a volitional, intentional reaction
(reaction-type). There were also some continuations that were
judged to be causal but it was unclear which of these two groups
they belonged to. These were coded as a third sub-type, “unclear
causal” (e.g., Joe punched Tom. Tom resented Joe for the result of
his life. Here, Tom’s resenting Joe is caused by the punch, but it is
not clear whether should be regarded as an involuntary, automatic
response or – especially in light of the long duration of the resent-
ment – as a more volitional reaction.) In the end, 5.6% of causal
continuations were coded as “unclear causal.”
Predictions
This experiments tests two main predictions. The more general
prediction has to do whether causal actions will boost the rate
of causal continuations in the sentence-completion task. If causal
action primes result in more causal continuations, this indicates
that these two processes make use of the same (or overlapping)
underlying representations.
The second main prediction has to do with the level of
detail that is encoded in the relevant representations. Impor-
tantly, the causal motor action primes used in Experiment 1
only involve involuntary consequences (e.g., the bowling pins fall
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Table 2 | Some of the most important coherence relation labels used in coding, and examples from participants’ continuations.
Causal sub-type – consequence: the event in the second sentence was caused by the
event described in the ﬁrst sentence, but the consequence is involuntary, automatic
(i) Jason kicked Matt. Matt felt hurt.
(ii) Lisa pinched Nancy. Nancy immediately woke up.
Causal sub-type – reaction: the event in the second sentence was caused by the event
described in the ﬁrst sentence, and the second event is an intentional, voluntary (re)action
to the ﬁrst event
(i) Greg slapped Josh. Josh punched him back.
(ii) Tony hit Kevin. Kevin called the police.
Explanation: the second sentence provides an explanation of why the event in the ﬁrst
sentence happened (“because”)
Angela scratched Melissa. Melissa’s back was
itching.
Elaboration:The second sentence provides a restatement of the ﬁrst sentence, perhaps
from another perspective or with more information
Ken poked Steven. He poked Steven right in the
gut.
Occasion: the second sentence describes an event that happens after the event
described in the ﬁrst sentence, but is not caused by the event in the ﬁrst sentence.
(“narrative” relation)
William tickled David. William took a video of
David’s laughing fit and put it on YouTube.
over). There are no causal primes with results that were voli-
tional reactions. Thus, by looking at which sub-type participants’
causal continuations fall into, we can see whether the motor
primes’ consequence-type nature is mirrored in the linguistic
continuations. If yes, this suggests that the representations that
overlap are more detailed than a simple causal/non-causal divi-
sion might suggest, i.e., that the domain-general representation
of causality is nevertheless sophisticated enough to include the
distinction between consequence-type and reaction-type causal
relations.
Both One-Event and Two-Event prime actions were included
in order to check whether the simple number of events could
play a role. In particular, it could be that what is being primed
is the number of distinct events or predicates or the fact that
there is a temporal sequence such that the second event occurs
after the ﬁrst event. According to this view, if someone carried
out a two-event action – regardless of whether it’s causal or non-
causal – this might prime them to produce a causal continuation
rather than an explanation or an elaboration, for example. Thus,
in order to be able to probe whether causal actions in particular
are priming causal continuations in the sentence-completion task,
Experiment 1 included both One-Event actions and non-causally
related Two-Event actions (in addition to the Causal actions).
RESULTS
To test whether the prime actions inﬂuenced participants’ con-
tinuations, mixed-effects logistic regression models were used
(e.g., Baayen et al., 2008) to analyze (i) the overall proportion
of causal continuations as a function of condition (Causal, One-
Event, Two-Event), (ii) the proportion of consequence-type causal
continuations as a function of condition, and (iii) the proportion
of reaction-type causal continuations as a function of condition. In
the initial general analyses, the three sub-types of causal contin-
uations – reaction-type causal continuations, consequence-type
causal continuations and unclear causal continuations – were all
grouped together. In each analysis, participant, and item were
included as random effects3.Mixed-effects regressionmodels were
3When specifying the structure of random effects, we started with fully crossed and
fully speciﬁed random effects, tested whether the model converges, and reduced
used because the data is categorical and thus not well-suited for
ANOVAs (see e.g., Jaeger, 2008). At the end of the results section,
we also consider a production study that addresses the question
of whether the results of Experiment 1 could be attributed to
syntactic priming. As will become clear, we argue that this is not
the case.
GENERAL CAUSALITY
Starting with the overall proportion of causal vs. non-causal
continuations, we see in Figure 2A (which includes all three
sub-types of causal continuations; consequence causal, reaction
causal and unclear causal) that participants’ continuations do
indeed show signiﬁcant effects of prime type: after perform-
ing Causal actions, participants produced signiﬁcantly more
Causal continuations than after performing One-Event actions
(80 vs. 66%, β=−1.115, Wald Z =−2.599, p < 0.01). The rate
of Causal continuations after Causal actions was also margin-
ally higher than the rate of Causal continuations after Two-Event
actions (80 vs. 71%, β=−0.774, Wald Z =−1.811, p = 0.07).
In contrast, there is no signiﬁcant difference between the rate
of Cause continuations occurring after One-Event and Two-
Event actions (β= 0.227, Wald Z = 0.621, p = 0.53). In sum, the
results indicate that performing a Causal action makes partici-
pants more likely to produce a causally connected continuation
in the sentence-continuation task, as compared to non-Causal
actions.
CAUSALITY SUB-TYPES
When we take a more detailed look at the two kinds of causal sub-
types, consequence-type causality and reaction-type causality, a
striking asymmetry emerges in terms of whether their frequen-
cies are affected by the action primes. First, when one considers
the proportion of reaction-type causal continuations, shown in
Figure 2B, there are no effects of priming (ps> 0.5). In general, the
rate of reaction-type continuations is relatively low (below 30%).
random effects (starting with item effects) until the model converged (see Jaeger at
http://hlplab.wordpress.com, May 14, 2009). Then, we used model comparison to
test each random effect; only those that were found to contribute signiﬁcantly to the
model were included in the ﬁnal analyses. However, all models contained random
intercepts for subjects and items.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Proportion of causal continuations as a function of the three
different kinds of prime actions. (Error bars show±1 SE). (B) Proportion of
reaction-type continuations as a function of the three different kinds of
prime actions. (Error bars show±1 SE). (C) Proportion of
consequence-type continuations as a function of the three different kinds
of prime actions. (Error bars show±1 SE.).
In contrast, the rate of consequence-type causal continuations –
as shown in Figure 2C – is clearly affected by the kind of motor
action that participants performed during the priming trials:
there are signiﬁcantly more consequence-type continuations after
Causal actions than after Two-Event actions (51 vs. 36.7% con-
sequence continuations, β=−0.83, Wald Z =−2.466, p < 0.02).
Similarly, the rate of consequence continuations was numeri-
cally higher after Causal actions than after One-Event actions
(51 vs. 41%, β=−0.486, Wald Z =−1.542, p = 0.123). The rate
of consequence-type continuations after One-Event actions and
Two-Event actions did not differ signiﬁcantly (β=−0.269, Wald
Z =−0.84, p = 0.4).
COULD THESE EFFECTS BE DUE TO SYNTACTIC PRIMING? PRODUCTION
STUDY
A potential question that comes up is whether the effects observed
here could be due to syntactic priming. It is well-known that hear-
ing or producing a particular kind of syntactic structure makes
people more likely to produce that structure again (Bock, 1986;
Pickering and Branigan, 1998; Bock and Grifﬁn, 2000; Arai et al.,
2007). In Experiment 1, the primes were presented in a non-
linguistic modality, but participants were not prevented from
encoding them linguistically (e.g., silently describing the action
in words). Thus, one might wonder whether the results reported
in the preceding sections could be due to priming of syntactic
representations.
To address this question, a production study was conducted: 24
new participants watched the experimenter carry out the action,
repeated the action themselves, andwere then asked to describe the
action inwords.More speciﬁcally, participants received the follow-
ing instructions: “What did you do/what happened? You should
write down whatever you feel best describes what happened, using
whatever words seem most appropriate to you.” Afterward, the
syntactic properties of participants’ descriptions were analyzed.
As will become clear below, the results of the production study
show that it is very unlikely that the results described above are
due to syntactic priming.
For One-Event actions, 92.7% of people’s descriptions were
monoclausal structures (e.g., “I arranged the sticks in a hexagon,”
“I arranged puzzle pieces for the bottom left corner of a puz-
zle”). The rest were also one-clause descriptions but contained
an additional fronted clause (e.g., “Using 6 puzzle pieces, I com-
pleted a portion of a puzzle of a red car”). In contrast, participants’
descriptions of Two-Event actions always included two verbs/two
predicates, due to the semantics of these primes involving two
distinct actions (e.g., “I made a cross out of two yellow sticks
and then rolled a red die,” “I put two sticks on top of each other
and then rolled a die,” “I opened and closed an orange folding
ruler before tying a knot into a piece of green sparkly plastic
tube.”)
However, the descriptions of the Causal actions are the ones
that are most relevant for the question of whether the results of
Experiment 1 could be due to syntactic priming. For the Causal
actions, 97.9% of descriptions were highly transitive (i.e., include
a subject, a verb, and a direct object), for example “I positioned
ﬁve dominoes in a line and knocked them over with a rubber
ball,” “I stacked the dominoes in a row, and knocked them down
with the ball,” “I placed two green and red toy cars facing right
and pushed the red one to hit the green and move it4.” All but
three of these descriptions included two or more transitive clauses
4Could the highly transitive nature of the causal descriptions be an artifact caused
by the instructions and not a true reﬂection of how the participants in Experiment
1 might have verbalized the events? Speciﬁcally, could it be that the production
instructions caused an artiﬁcially high rate of responses like “I knocked over the
dominoes with a ball” instead of “The ball knocked over the dominoes”? In our
opinion, the high rate of ﬁrst-person sentences is unlikely to be due to the word-
ing of the instructions: First, in both Experiment 1 and the production study, each
trial involved two occurrences of the action being conducted by a human agent
(the experimenter and then the participant), and so it seems unlikely that partici-
pants would verbalize the actions without encoding the human agent. The second
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(like the examples above), and the three remaining descriptions
consisted of a single transitive clause (e.g., “I pushed the red car
into the green car.”) In sum, in the vast majority of cases people
produced multiple transitive clauses when describing the causal
actions.
The high rate of transitive sentences is noteworthy when cou-
pled with the observation that consequence-type continuations
are less transitive than reaction-type continuations. Consequence-
type continuations (where the result is an involuntary conse-
quence) are often intransitive and lack a direct object (e.g., “She
felt hurt”, “He fell over”), whereas reaction-type continuations
(where the result is a volitional, intentional reaction) are often
highly transitive and mention an object to whom some action is
done (e.g., “He punched him back”, “Melissa told on Angela”).
If the causal actions were syntactically priming participants’ con-
tinuations in the sentence-completion task, Experiment 1 should
have resulted in the exactly opposite pattern of what was actually
found, namely Causal actions boosting the rate of consequence-
type continuations but havingno effect on the rate of reaction-type
continuations.
In sum, we take the results of this production study as an
indication that the results of Experiment 1 cannot be attributed
to syntactic priming: if anything is being primed by the causal
actions, it is a transitive structure, which could not generate the
results that were obtained. (It is important to note that the aim
of the production study was simply to address potential concerns
regarding syntactic priming. The ﬁnding that the actions used in
Experiment 1 were almost always described with transitive sen-
tences should not be interpreted as a claim that all causal event
sequences must be described with transitives; the relation between
transitivity and event structure is a complex topic that is beyond
the scope of this paper. The modest aim of the production study
was simply to assess the potential impact (or lack thereof) of syn-
tactic priming.) In sum, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
results of Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to priming on the
level of syntactic representations. Rather, it seems that priming
is taking place on the level of more abstract conceptual repre-
sentations that are shared both by motor actions and linguistic
representations.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1, which used a priming paradigm involving motor
actions that preceded target trials in a sentence-completion task,
showed that Causal action primes resulted in more causally con-
nected sentence-completions thanOne-Event orTwo-Event action
(related) reason why we expect people’s descriptions to have human agents regard-
less of the instructions is based on prior work showing that animate entities (in
this case “I,” the participant) are highly accessible and usually realized in subject
position (e.g., Branigan et al., 2008). Thus, it seems that the high rate of transitive
sentences with ﬁrst-person subjects is unlikely to be due to the instructions. We feel
that the production study can be used to test whether syntactic priming might be
responsible for the results of Experiment 1 (and to argue, as we do, that the results
cannot be attributed to syntactic priming). Further evidence for the claim that the
results discussed in this paper cannot be reduced to syntactic priming comes from
Experiment 2, where participants produced an increased proportion of sentences
with two distinct subjects following Two-Event primes – which, if described linguis-
tically, would yield two sentences with the same subject (e.g., “I opened the ruler
and I tied the pencil in a knot.”).
primes. As a whole, this ﬁnding points toward a shared abstract
level of representation being activated/used by motor sequences
and discourse-level coherence relations.
More speciﬁcally, the results show that the priming effect is
carried by an increase in the rate of consequence-type causal
continuations, and not the rate of reaction-type continuations:
participants were equally likely to produce reaction-type contin-
uations in all three prime conditions. In contrast, after carry-
ing out a causal action sequence involving a consequence-type
relation, participants produced a higher rate of consequence-
type continuations in the sentence-completion task, compared to
non-causal action primes. Overall, causal primes resulted in sig-
niﬁcantly more consequence-type continuations than Two-Event
primes and in numerically more consequence-type continuations
than One-Event primes. As predicted, One-Event primes and
Two-Event primes do not differ in the proportion of subsequent
consequence-type continuations. (It is not clear why the differ-
ence between Causal primes and One-Event primes does not quite
reach signiﬁcance.)
Given that the causal motor actions involved consequence-type
relations rather than reaction-type relations, the results of Exper-
iment 1 suggest that a shared abstract level of representation is
activated by motor sequences and discourse-level coherence rela-
tions, and that this level of representation is sufﬁciently detailed to
encode the distinction between consequence and reaction. How-
ever, it is important to keep in mind that participants were not
prevented from encoding the prime actions linguistically (i.e.,
were not prevented from putting them in words). Thus, the motor
action information could have been converted into some kind of
linguistic information by the participants, which in turn could
be what overlaps with the representations that participants use in
the sentence-continuation task. Importantly, the production study
described above provides evidence that the results of Experiment
1 cannot be derived from syntactic priming. This indicates that the
relevant level of representation is not syntactic. Instead, it seems
more plausible to assume that the motor actions, whether they are
encoded linguistically or not, are activating semantic representa-
tions that also involve information about the relations between
events, and that this is what overlaps with the representations used
in the sentence-continuation task.
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 indicate that causality repre-
sentations, even when originating from non-linguistic,motor action
input, seem to be sufﬁciently richly encoded to have subtle effects
on language production.
It is interesting tonote that the distinctionbetween reaction and
consequence is also relevant in the domain of cognitive psychology
for the difference between physical causation and social causa-
tion (e.g., Kanizsa and Vicario, 1968; Schlottmann et al., 2006).
A situation where one billiard ball hits another involves physical
causation, whereas a situation where one animal runs away from
another involves social causation.Althoughnot normally described
in terms of reaction vs. consequence, it seems that the distinc-
tion between physical and social causation could be interpreted as
mapping onto the distinction between consequence-type causal
relations and reaction-type causal relations respectively. Work in
cognitive psychology suggests that there are somedifferences in the
perception of social and physical causality by adults (Schlottmann
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et al., 2006), and this seems to align well with the results of
Experiment 1, which point to a cognitively meaningful distinc-
tion between reaction-type causal relations and consequence-type
causal relations.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that detailed information
about coherence relations – causality in particular – can be rep-
resented in a domain-general way. This suggests that our mental
representations of coherence relations contain ﬁne-grained, spe-
ciﬁc information. However, if our aim is to learn more about the
mental representations of coherence relations,we alsowant to gain
an understanding of the more general properties of coherence rep-
resentations. Thus, Experiment 2 shifts away from the speciﬁcs to a
more abstract level, and explores a very general property of event
sequences, namely the representation of event boundaries. The
human ability to segment stimuli into distinct events is a crucial
aspect of cognition. In the visual domain, the boundaries between
events have been shown to have effects on attention and memory
(e.g., Swallow et al., 2009), suggesting that the cognitive process
of shifting from one event to another has far-reaching effects on
humans’ mental representations.
Experiment 2 addresses two main questions. First, it tests
whether the presence/absence of event boundaries in the domain
of motor actions inﬂuences how participants complete the lin-
guistic sentence-continuation task. In particular, does performing
two distinct actions (Two-Event primes) make participants more
likely to produce continuations with two distinct subjects – i.e.,
continuations which shift attention to a new character? Con-
versely, does performing one action (One-Event primes) make
participants more likely to maintain focus on the subject of the
prompt sentence? As will be discussed in more detail in the
“predictions” section, referent shifts were used as the depen-
dent variable because of the well-known association between
subjects and topics. The second main aim of this experiment
is to gain insights into how causality is represented, and so
it tests whether Causal primes pattern like Two-Event or like
One-Event primes, in terms of the referential shift patterns that
they induce. In other words, how are two causally connected
events conceptualized – more like a one-event situation or a
two-event sequence? A better understanding of this issue can
help to clarify whether the event structure of causal sequences
is best grouped with one-event representations or two-event
representations.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four adult native English speakers from the University of
Southern California community participated. None of the par-
ticipants had participated in the other studies reported in this
paper.
Materials
Motor action trials (prime trials). The same actions were used
as in Experiment 1.
Sentence-completion trials (target trials). Instead of the agent-
patient verbs used in Experiment 1, this experiment uses a class
of so-called implicit-causality verbs (IC; Garvey and Caramazza,
1974; Stewart et al., 2000; Koornneef and Van Berkum, 2006),
namely so-called Noun1 IC verbs, e.g., frighten, annoy, and amuse:
Angela frightened Melissa.
She was wearing a scary mask. (3)
Noun1 IC verbs were chosen for Experiment 2 because they allow
for a situation where no overwhelming subject or object bias is
expected, and thus they are well-suited for the purpose of test-
ing whether the prime motor actions can induce referential shifts.
The agent-patient verbs used in Experiment 1 would not have
been suitable for this purpose, because they have a strong pref-
erence to shift to talking about the object (e.g., Stevenson et al.,
1994), which could mask weak shifts toward the subject or lead to
potential ceiling effects in the case of the object.
Let us consider in more depth why Noun1 IC verbs are well-
suited for Experiment 2: priorwork has shown that,when followed
by the connective because, this particular class of IC verb tends
to elicit continuations that start with reference to the preced-
ing subject. For example, with a sentence like “Angela frightened
Melissa because . . .” or “Angela amused Melissa because . . .,”
the presence of the connective “because” signals that an expla-
nation must be provided, and so participants tend to continue
by saying something about the subject Angela (Noun1). Given
this robust preference, this class of IC verbs is called Noun1
IC verbs. However, Rohde (2008, see also Kehler et al., 2008;
for summary of these results) showed that when no overt con-
nective is provided and participants’ continuations constitute a
new sentence (as in ex.3), Noun1 IC verbs show a very differ-
ent pattern: now, continuations after Noun1 IC verbs are almost
equally likely to refer to the preceding subject or the preceding
object (about 60% subject continuations, 40% object continua-
tions) – this differs strikingly from the pattern that is observedwith
a “because” connective (85% subject continuations, see Rohde,
2008). The absence of a clear subject preference in the absence
of an explicit connective presumably stems from the resulting
absence of any explicit coherence relation constraints: when given
a sentence with an IC verb that is not followed by an explicit
because, participants still produce a fairly high rate of explanation
continuations (over 55% in Rohde’s study), but they also pro-
duce other coherence relations, many of which tend to start with
the non-subject. This shifts the overall reference pattern to one
where the preceding subject and object are (near)equal candidates
for subsequent reference. Thus, thanks to this balanced situation,
Noun1 IC verbswith noovert connective arewell-suited for Exper-
iment 2, where we are interested in seeing whether priming with
motor actions inﬂuences the likelihood of maintaining vs. shifting
reference.
It is worth noting that although explanation relations resemble
causal (cause-effect) relations in that both refer to causes and con-
sequences – albeit in a different linear order –, existing research
suggests that these relations differ in fundamental ways. Causal
relations are often regarded as more iconic, since they reﬂect the
natural chronological order of events, unlike explanation relations
(see van den Broek, 1990; see also Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998).
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This fundamental distinction is supported by recent psycholin-
guistic research by Briner et al. (2012) who found that explanation
relations are processed more slowly than causal relations (see
also Noordman, 2001 for related work and Johnston and Welsh,
2000 for data from language acquisition). In light of these differ-
ences, this paper treats causal relations and explanation relations
as distinct.
Coding. Continuationswere analyzed forwhich character ismen-
tioned at the start of the continuation, the preceding subject or
object (or both or neither). As in Experiment 1, two coders blind
to the experimental conditions worked independently. Afterward,
disagreements were resolved through discussion. If the coders
could not agree, the item was marked as “unclear” (13.5% of the
trials).
Predictions
When continuing the prompt sentence, e.g., “Jason frightened
Matt”, participants may opt to continue by talking about Jason,
as shown in ex(4a). Here, the prompt sentence and the continu-
ation sentence have the same subject, Jason. In other words, we
are maintaining focus on the initial subject. This referent mainte-
nance pattern can also be thought of as topic maintenance, given
that the topic of a sentence is normally realized in subject position
in English (Reinhart, 1982; Chafe, 1994; Lambrecht, 1994).
Alternatively, participants may choose to shift to talking about
the other character, namely the preceding object [ex (4b)]. Here,
the prompt sentence and the continuation sentence have different
subjects, in a pattern that we can characterize as shifting to a new
character or topic-shift.
Jason frightened Matt. He was wearing a scary mask.
(4a)
Jason frightened Matt. He ran away screaming. (4b)
Experiment 2 aims to test whether the presence/absence of
event boundaries in motor actions inﬂuences the likelihood of
topic-shifts in the sentence-completion task. If the mental rep-
resentations activated by shifting from one motor action to
another (Two-Event primes) overlap with the representations acti-
vated when shifting from one referent to another [topic-shift,
ex.(4a)], then there should be more topic-shifts (object-referring
continuations) after Two-Event primes than after One-Event
primes. In other words, we should ﬁnd a higher rate of object-
referring continuations (and a lower rate of subject-referring
continuations) after Two-Event primes than after One-Event
primes.
If this holds, it would show that in a situation where the prime
clearly involves two distinct events, this can induce referent shifts.
With this ﬁnding, we can then turn to the Causal primes, to see
whether they pattern more like Two-Event primes or like One-
Event primes. In other words, will they trigger shifts to another
character, or will we see a pattern of topic maintenance? The
former result would suggest that Causal sequences are conceptu-
alized as two events, whereas the latter would indicate that Causal
sequences are conceptualized as single events.
More broadly, if Experiment 2 reveals an effect of the
prime actions’ event structure on the referent-shift/referent
maintenance patterns in participants’ continuations, this would
provide evidence that the representations activated by the event
structure of the motor actions overlap with the representa-
tions that are activated during referential processing in dis-
course.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to test whether the rate
of object-referring continuations differs as a function of the prime
action. In other words, are people more likely to shift to talking
about the object of the preceding sentence after some prime types
than others? Only those continuations that started with reference
to either the preceding subject or object were included; continua-
tions that were coded as “unclear” or that began with reference to
another entity were excluded from subsequent analyses (13.5%).
In each analysis, participant, and item as were included as random
effects5.
As can be seen in Figure 3, the proportion of continuations that
startedwith the prompt sentence object is signiﬁcantly higher after
Two-Event primes than after One-Event primes (65.9 vs. 45.24%,
β= 1.121, Wald Z = 3.181, p < 0.005). This suggests that the rate
of referential shifts does indeed correlate to the One-Event vs.
Two-Event distinction in the predictedway:when the prime action
shifts from one event to another, this is reﬂected in participants’
continuations. Crucially, a comparison of Two-Event primes and
Causal primes reveals signiﬁcantly more shifting to the prompt
sentence object after Two-Event primes than after Causal primes
(65.9 vs. 48.75%, β=−1.098,Wald Z =−2.796, p < 0.01). Causal
primes and One-Event primes did not differ (β= 0.303, Wald
Z = 0.844, p = 0.4). In sum, Causal prime actions pattern like
One-Event prime actions, and both of these differ from Two-Event
primes.
We interpret the ﬁnding that Two-Event primes result in more
object-referring continuations than One-Event primes as evidence
5Random effect structure was determined as in Experiment 1.
FIGURE 3 | Proportion of continuations that start by referring to the
preceding subject or the preceding object, as a function of prime type.
(Error bars show±1 SE.)
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition June 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 156 | 10
Kaiser Cross-modal investigation of discourse structure
that the mental representations activated by shifting from one-
event to another event overlap with the mental representations
activated by shifting one’s attention from one referent to another
(topic-shift). The ﬁnding that Causal primes pattern like One-
Event primes in failing to create a bias for topic-shifting suggests
that Causal prime actions are conceptualized – at least at some
level – in the same way as One-Event actions. Thus, even though
the Causal sequences do involve two sub-events (e.g., event 1: I
roll the ball, event 2: the bowling pins fall over), our ﬁndings sug-
gest that these sub-events are conceptualized as one (potentially
complex) event.
In addition to computing the proportion of continuations with
topic-shift vs. topic maintenance, the coherence relations in par-
ticipants’ continuations were also analyzed. They were coded the
same way as in Experiment 1. (However, this was not the main
aim of Experiment 2: no causal priming was expected in Experi-
ment 2, given that the IC verbs used in this study tend to exhibit a
strong bias for explanation relations,which is expected tomask any
potential causal priming.) As expected, the most frequent coher-
ence relation in all three conditions was the explanation/because
relation (e.g., Angela frightened Melissa. She was not wearing any
makeup.)6 All three conditions showed 45–48% explanation con-
tinuations (a high proportion, given the large number of different
coherence relations that are available), and there were no signif-
icant differences between conditions. The overall rates of causal
continuations (around 35%), as well as the rate of the consequence
and reaction sub-types, also did not differ signiﬁcantly across con-
ditions. In our opinion, the lack of signiﬁcant priming for causal
(cause+ effect) relations is not surprising, given that IC verbs have
a strong inherent bias for another kind of continuation (explana-
tion). More generally, when combined with Experiment 1, these
patterns suggest that causal priming can be masked in the presence
of a stronger discourse-level bias – a ﬁnding which ﬁts with the
general observation that priming effects (syntactic, semantic, etc.)
are often relatively small but nevertheless real.
As a whole, the key ﬁnding from Experiment 2 – that refer-
ent shifts can be induced by priming with two discrete motor
actions – suggests that shifting one’s attention from one event to
another resembles the act of shifting one’s attention from one ref-
erent to another. This points to intriguing similarities between our
mental representations of events and entities, something which is
also reﬂected in the fact that they can both be referred to with the
same kinds of anaphoric expressions, as illustrated in (5a–b; e.g.,
Webber, 1991; Kehler and Ward, 2004).
A rollerskate was found behind the old shelves.
< It > was full of cobwebs. (5a)
Peter fell over when rollerskating. < It > was quite a sight! (5b)
6When thinking about the subject/object biases and coherence relation biases of IC
verbs, it is important to keep in mind that although coherence relations and referen-
tial patterns are often related (e.g., with Noun1 IC verbs, explanation continuations
tend to start by talking about the preceding subject, Noun1), this is not an absolute
relationship (see also Pickering and Majid, 2007, p. 784 for related discussion). For
example, it is perfectly possible to generate explanation continuations after Noun1
IC verbs that do not start by referring to Noun1 (e.g., Jason frightened Matt. Matt
was very easily startled by the smallest thing.)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two experiments presented in this paper used a cross-modal
priming paradigm to investigate how people represent coher-
ence relations in linguistic and non-linguistic domains. Although
the coherence relations between sentences play a central role in
language comprehension, researchers have come to divergent con-
clusions about how humans represent and process coherence rela-
tions,aswell aswhat theproper taxonomyof coherence relations is.
The two experiments in this paper aim to shed some light on these
issues, although many questions still remain open for future work.
Experiment 1 explored the domain-generality of coherence
relations and the level of detail present in these representations,
with a focus on causal relations. Participants carried out different
kinds of motor actions (Causal actions, Two-Event actions, and
One-Event actions), and provided continuations for agent-patient
sentences (e.g., “Mary pinched Kate.”) The coherence relations in
participants’ continuations were analyzed. The results showed that
carrying out causal actions – as compared to non-causal actions –
made participants more likely to provide causal continuations in
the sentence-continuation task. We interpret this as an indication
that the mental representations activated by the motor actions
overlap, at least in part, with the mental representations used dur-
ing linguistic discourse-level processing. Furthermore, a detailed
analysis of the results shows that the boost in causal continuations
is carried by a particular sub-type of causal relations, namely con-
sequence relations (rather than reaction relations). This shows that
the mental representations activated by the motor actions contain
ﬁne-grained information about the difference between reactions
and consequences, and that this is also reﬂected in the linguistic
domain. Although existing models of coherence relations differ in
whether they represent coherence relations as logical rules or hier-
archical structures (see e.g., Sanders et al., 1993;Webber et al., 2003
for discussion), both of these approaches are in theory compatible
with the ﬁndings of Experiment 1, as long as they are able to dis-
tinguish sub-types of causal relations and allow for some level of
representational overlap between discourse-level processing and
more domain-general knowledge systems related to causality and
event structure.
Because participants were not prevented from encoding the
motor actions in linguistic form (e.g., silently describe them), one
might wonder about the actual source of the priming effects. To
shed light on this, a production study was conducted, and the
results indicate that the priming effects observed in Experiment 1
cannot be attributed to syntactic priming. Instead, it seems that the
connection is on the level of semantic/conceptual representations:
it seems reasonable to conclude that causality representations that
were originally triggered by the presentation of non-linguistic,
visuo-motor stimuli are tapping into the same (or overlapping)
level of representation that is used during the comprehension and
production of linguistic stimuli.
To better understand how humans represent coherence rela-
tions, we need to gain insights not only into the ﬁne-grained
details but also the more general properties of these represen-
tations. Experiment 2 explored a truly fundamental property
of event sequences, namely the presence of event boundaries.
Using the same kind of priming paradigm as in Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 looked at the cognitive consequences of shifting
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one’s attention from one event to another, separate event. The
results point to parallels between shifting one’s attention from one
event to another and shifting one’s attention from one referent
to another. More speciﬁcally, Two-Event primes were more likely
to result in referential shifts in participants’ linguistic continua-
tions than One-Event primes. This study also found that Causal
primes trigger the same patterns as One-Event primes, suggesting
that the two sub-events comprising the Causal sequences are con-
ceptualized as one event (potentially with some kind of internal
structure). However, although the outcomes of Experiment 2 shed
new light on the nature of discourse-level representations, more
work is needed before we can attain a deep understanding of the
similarities between shifting between events and shifting between
referents, and whether other factors – in addition to event bound-
aries – may also be inﬂuencing the likelihood of topic-shift in these
kinds of contexts. Because the research methodology used in this
paper (using motor actions as primes for potential discourse-level
effects) is still very new, future work will play an important role in
helping us to gain a more in-depth understanding of this area.
Broadly speaking, these studies contribute to our understand-
ing of how coherence relations are represented in the mind.
The ﬁnding that non-linguistic stimuli can inﬂuence coherence-
related processes in the linguistic domain also ﬁts well with results
obtained in earlier work (Kaiser, 2009). In two eye-tracking studies
using a priming paradigm, Kaiser (2009) explored how coher-
ence relations presented by means of visuo-spatial/non-linguistic
primes or by means of linguistic primes inﬂuence pronoun inter-
pretation. Recent research has shown that pronoun interpretation
is sensitive to the coherence relations between sentences, as exem-
pliﬁed in ex.(6) where interpretation of “him” is inﬂuenced by the
coherence relation between the clauses (causal vs. parallel).
Phil tickled Stanley, and [AS A RESULT] Liz poked himPhil
[him ⇒ Phil]. (6a)
Phil tickled Stanley, and [SIMILARLY] Liz poked himStanley.
[him ⇒ Stanley]. (6b)
Kaiser (2009) conducted two experiments using a paradigm
that combines visual-world eye-tracking and priming. In one
experiment,participantswere presentedwith visuo-spatial primes,
silent video clips that encoded causal relations, similarity rela-
tions or other/neutral relations (e.g., Causal=Triangle knocks
into circle which falls off a ledge). In another experiment, the
coherence relation primes were linguistic (e.g., participants read
“The patient pressed the red emergency button near the bed
and a nurse quickly ran into the room” for Causal). Partici-
pants were then shown a target scene with three characters and
heard a sentence like “Phil linded Stanley and Kate hepped him.”
(Nonce words were used to eliminate verb semantics). Partici-
pants’ eye-movements were used to assess which entities were
considered as referents for “him.” The results show that pro-
noun interpretation can indeed be primed by coherence relations
in preceding linguistic and visual input, even when primes and
targets are connected only on the level of abstract coherence rela-
tions, and even when primes are presented in a non-linguistic
modality.
These earlier ﬁndings, like the two productions studies
presented in the current paper, highlight the important role
that coherence relations play in language processing, and sug-
gest that coherence relations make reference to domain-general
representations. Broadly speaking, this line of research has
the potential to offer new insights into the nature of the
interface between linguistic and non-linguistic representations.
It taps into one of the central questions in psycholinguis-
tics, namely the extent to which language is distinct from
other cognitive processes vs. supported by domain-general
processes.
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